讲座题目:纵向契约对下游合谋的影响
The Power of Upstream Contracting over
Downstream Collusion
报告人: 黄正 博士
主持人:郭玉清 教授
点评人:施炳展 教授 杨光 副教授
时间:12月29日(周五) 14:30
地点:经济学院高层 10楼会议室
演讲论文摘要:
下游零售商合谋可对上游制造商造成利益损害。本文通过构建理论模型说明制造商可利用纵向非线性契约制约零售商合谋,并同时提高社会福利。基于本文的结论,作者提出关于价格规制、合谋行为检测等方面的几点政策建议。
Collusion by downstream firms can be detrimental to the upstream suppliers. I show that a monopolist supplier can use nonlinear pricing contracts to weaken downstream firms' ability to engage in collusive behavior, while also generating a positive welfare effect. Regulatory policy targeting upstream nonlinear pricing may weaken downstream competition. Because upstream pricing behavior differs with and without downstream collusion, the model also provides authorities with a new tool for detecting collusion.
报告人简介
黄正,经济学博士,2017年毕业于加州大学圣地亚哥分校(University of California, San Diego),主要研究产业组织理论。